THE EFFECT OF THE CONTINUING
VIOLATIONS THEORY ON TITLE VII
BACK PAY CALCULATIONS
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I. INTRODUCTION

In implementing the statutory award of "back pay" as a remedy
for unlawful employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the judiciary has wrestled with the proper
calculation of damages. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2
When there has been a judicial determination of unlawful discrimination, 3 Title VII authorizes a panoply of remedies, including back
pay.4
* J.D., 1981, Fordham University School of Law; Associate, Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, Newark, New Jersey.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 703-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Title

VII].
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provides in pertinent part:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
id.
' The judiciary is empowered to adjudicate claims of discrimination in employment pursuant to a complex procedural process. See inJra notes 6-19 and accompanying text. Discrimination
in employment may also be the object of an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979), enacted pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1871, to enforce the
provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Although actions under these statutes
may be taken against public and private entities as well as individuals, such actions require a
showing of intentional discrimination, generally a higher standard of proof than that required
under Title VII. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
(proof of racially discriminatory purpose a prerequisite for § 1981 suit). Moreover, § 1981 is
limited to discrimination relating to race. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see also
Trehan v. IBM Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (§ 1981 does not
extend to discrimination based on national origin); Reese v. Abbott Laboratories, 493 F. Supp.
185 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (§ 1981 does not extend to religious discrimination).
Section 706 of Title VII provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
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This Article will focus upon the methods by which Title VII back
pay awards have been calculated. In considering such calculations,
this Article reviews the statutory basis for back pay awards and the
conflicting manner in which the back pay directives have been implemented by the courts. More particularly, this Article examines the
widening split among the circuit courts concerning the extent to
which events occurring prior to the statutory time limitation period
prescribed for back pay awards may be considered in calculating this
remedy. Finally, the Article analyzes this judicial divergence in light
of the continuing violations theory and proposes an approach by
which back pay may be uniformly calculated.
Title VII is a broad remedial statute5 which provides a series of
procedures by which claims of discrimination in employment are
investigated and determined." Pursuant to these procedures, a complainant 7 must file a charge8 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of an unlawful discriminatory act, 9 after which the EEOC is empowered to investigate'0 and
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay' (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue
from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.
Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an
individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual
was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of
section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); see also id. § 2000e-16(b).
I Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-65 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-22 (1975).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-9. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), created by Title VII, see id. § 2000e-4, is vested with the authority to receive and
investigate individual charges of discrimination, and thereafter, to determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge is true. Id. § 2000e-4 to 2000e-5.
I The charge may also be filed by another person on the complainant's behalf or by a
member of the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
8 Specific procedures by which a charge is filed and processed have been promulgated by
the EEOC, see id. § 2000e-12, and are codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1601 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). As originally enacted, this time limitation was 90 da's. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(d) (1970). It was increased to 180 days by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 105.
The filing procedure is modified if the employee's state has its own employment discrimination statute and an agency charged with its enforcement. In such a case, the complainant must
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determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe a violation has
occurred." In the event the EEOC does not find reasonable cause, it
dismisses the charge and so notifies the complainant who may then
institute a civil suit.12 If, on the other hand, the EEOC finds reasonable cause, it seeks from the respondent voluntary compliance with a
conciliation agreement designed to informally eliminate unlawful employment practices.' 3 If conciliation efforts fail, the EEOC may then
institute a civil action against the discriminating employer.' 4 If the
EEOC declines to institute suit within 180 days of the filing, it issues a
right-to-sue letter to the complainant. 5 Upon receipt of this6 letter, a
complainant has ninety days in which to file a civil action. 1
comply with the state procedure before he may invoke EEOC procedures. Charges may not be
filed with the EEOC until 60 days after proceedings have commenced before the state agency or
until the state proceedings have been terminated, whichever is earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
Charges initially filed with the EEOC in such states are referred to the appropriate state agency
and held in abeyance by the EEOC pending the state agency's disposition. Id. § 2000e-5(d); 29
C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1982). Other statutory time limitations are adjusted accordingly to allow for
this deferral period. See 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(e); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(5) (1982). Charges filed
in deferral states are deemed timely if filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act. 42
U.S.C. § 20O0e-5(e).
New Jersey is among the states having an employment discrimination program. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to :5-39 (1976 & West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983). According to a work share
agreement entered into by the EEOC and the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights, however,
New Jersey will waive its rights to exclusive review during the initial 60 day period. See
Worksharing Agreement Between the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Philadelphia and New York District Offices § 111(c).
Therefore, the statutory provisions requiring a complainant to first exhaust state administrative
remedies before filing charges with the EEOC are somewhat circumscribed.
1042 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15 (1982).
1 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1982).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(f) (1982).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1982).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the respondent is a "government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision" any litigation must be instituted by the Attorney General. Id. The EEOC
rarely institutes actions; indeed, Title VII as originally enacted limited the EEOC's enforcement
powers to that of conciliation. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 253,
258-59.
The EEOC may also initiate suits in its own interest where it finds "reasonable cause to
believe that [a] person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by [Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), (c). Broad
remedial relief is also permissible under this section. See id.
'5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This notice indicates that the EEOC has completed its investigation and has decided not to process the complaint further. More importantly, it states that the
complainant has a right to institute suit against the employer within 90 days of receipt. It also
contains '[a]dvice concerning the institution of a civil action by the [complainant] . . . [and a]
copy of the charge." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(2), (3) (1982). This letter is sent to the complainant
in the instance of a finding of reasonable cause or a finding of no reasonable cause. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1601.19 (0, .21(b) (1982).
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1982). The EEOC may intervene in
private actions at the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.29 (1982).
As pointed out, supra note 14, the EEOC originally did not have the power to institute suit.
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Jurisdiction over such actions is vested in the federal courts.17 To
recover in a federal action, a complainant must demonstrate as part of
his prima facie case not only that the underlying EEOC charge was
timely filed, i.e., that it was "filed within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,"' 18 but
also that suit was instituted within ninety days of the right to sue
letter. 19

II.

BACK PAY CALCULATION

A. Statutory Directives
If a complainant complies with the procedural prerequisites of
Title VII, and thereafter successfully demonstrates that an employer
has engaged in unlawful employment discrimination against him, 20 a
federal court is empowered to "enjoin the ... [employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, 2' and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay. ' 22 A court's power to award back pay is not absolute, but rather
is statutorily limited in amount and duration. Section 706(g) provides
that back pay awards must be reduced by "[i]nterim earnings or
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence."23 As to duration, sec-

Thus, when it failed to secure voluntary compliance within 30 days after filing of the charge
(extended to 60 days in 1972), it issued a right-to-sue letter to the complainant, who had 30 days
thereafter to file suit. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(e) (1970) (amended 1972).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). But see Fox v. Eaton Co., 615 F.2d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981) (whether state courts lack concurrent jurisdiction under Title
VII is "far from clear"); Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1322
(W.D. Tex. 1979); Brennan v. Rutgers Bd. of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274 (D.N.J. 1976);
Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978).
I8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); see supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
"942 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1982).
" Proof of intentional discrimination varies depending upon, inter alia, the nature of the
discrimination alleged and the person or persons claiming such discrimination. See generally
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). For an excellent general discussion of the substantive issues and their resolution in a
Title VII context, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1147-58
(1976).
21 Unlawful employment practices are defined in §§ 703 and 704 of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-3.
22 Id. § 2000e-5(g).
23 Id.; see Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982) (rejected job applicant's
obligation to minimize damages requires applicant to accept unconditional offer of job originally
sought, even if offer does not include retroactive seniority); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973).

266

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:262

tion 706(g) provides that "[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a
date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the
Commission."2 4 It is this latter restriction that has been the major
source of conflict among the courts.
B. Legislative History
Section 706(g), as originally enacted, did not place any time limit
on the period for which back pay could be recovered. 25 The Act
simply authorized a federal court, in an appropriate case, to award
this remedy. 26 Thus, unimpeded by time limitations on back pay
relief, courts awarded back pay for widely differing time periods. 27 In
this regard, the EEOC advocated a very liberal position, indicating
that all Title VII "remedies- including backpay-for discriminatory
acts may reach back to the effective date of the act, July 2, 1965."28
Most courts rejected the EEOC's position and generally applied the
most analogous state statute. 29 Such divergent approaches and results
in back pay awards promoted forum shopping, numerous appeals,
30
and confusion and debate among the employment bar and bench.
Additionally, § 713 provides a defense to back pay liability when discrimination was
practiced in "good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or
opinion of the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.33 (1982).
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). It is important to note that a claimant is not automatically
entitled
to back pay for a two year period. Rather, back pay generally is only awarded if the plaintiff
suffers a loss due to a discriminatory act. B. SCHLIE & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 20, at 1239-40.
Even under § 706(g) as originally enacted, the back pay period could not commence prior to July
2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 410
(1975). Further, in cases involving individuals, the period generally terminates when there is an
offer of employment, reinstatement, or promotion. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 102 S.
Ct. 3057 (1982); United States v.U.S. Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1058 (5th Cir. 1975).
25 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 253, 261.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975) (three year state
statute of limitations applied in actions recovering personal and property damages applicable to
Title VII action); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 923-25 (5th Cir. 1973) (two
year statute of limitations applying to action for unpaid wages relied on by court in back pay
calculation).
25 117 CONG. REC. 31,981 (1971), SUBCOMMITrEE ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
MENT OPPORTUNITY

ACT

OF

92D CONG., 2D Srss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOY1972, at 249 (Comm. Print 1972) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn)

[hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE PRINT].
29 See supra note 27.
30 See generally Sand, Back Pay Problems Under Title VII, 27 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LAB.
151 (1974). The lack of explicit time limitations under the original civil rights laws, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), has spawned similar confusion as to what state statute
and time period is most appropriate to govern back pay claims. See, e.g., Burns v. Sullivan, 24
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 39 (1st Cir. 1980) (six month limitation period of Massachusetts
Fair Employment Practices Act rather than state's three year general tort statute of limitations
applies to § 1983 claim); McGee v. Grand Rapids Press, 486 F. Supp. 584 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
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Congress, concerned that the general lack of definite time limitations on back pay recovery and the interpretations of the EEOC and
the courts could "subject [employers] to enormous monetary penalties," '3' amended section 706(g) in 1972 to limit back pay awards to the
two years prior to the date that an EEOC charge was filed. 32 In
33
formulating a time limitation on back pay recovery, the drafters of
section 706(g) contrasted Title VII's lack of time limitations with "the
universal existence of time limitations on liability not only in private
civil litigation, but also in other Federal administrative proceedings as
well.-

34

Accordingly, throughout the legislative history, 35 and later in

the amendments, 36 the legislators indicated that "no [court] shall
include back pay or liability which accrued more than two years prior
'37
to the filing of a charge with the Commission.
The critical word in section 706(g) as amended is "accrue," since
back pay which has not accrued within the limitation period may not
be awarded. Accrued is a term with several different meanings, 38 yet a
(three year statute of limitations for § 1981 claim); Theobald v.Botein, Hays, Sklar & Herzberg,
493 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (one year statute of limitations for § 1981 claim).
3
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2137, 2175 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
32 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 107
(codified as anmended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
31 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was introduced into the 92d Congress by
Representative Hawkins, and was referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor, see
COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 28, at 1, and thereafter to its subcommittee on Labor, chaired by
Representative Dent. See id. at II. It was reported to the Senate and introduced therein by
Senator Williams and Senator Byrd. Id. at 157. The bill was referred to the Senate's Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare and thereafter to its subcommittee on Labor, chaired by Senator
Williams. Id., see id. at II. For an extensive discussion of the legislative history of the 1972
amendments, see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
11 117 CONG. REC. H8462 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1971); see HousE REPORT, supra note 31, at 66,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2175.
31 See S. CONF. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972); House REPORT, supra note 31,
at 66, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2175; COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note

28, at 1827 (statement of Rep. Perkins): id. at 1848 (statement of Sen. Williams). See generally
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971).
3 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
a HOUSE REPORT supra note 31, at 66, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2175. Legislative history concerning § 706(g) is sparse; however, what little is available suggests
that the back pay provision under Title VII was patterned after the back pay award permitted
under § 10(c) of The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 nl (1975).
" The meaning of the term accrued varies depending upon the context in which it is used.
Regarding statutes of limitations, an action is said to accrue or mature when the right to seek
redress becomes vested. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). In the business or

accounting sense, accrued denotes an item of expense or interest which has become payable or
chargeable to a particular person or account. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 13 (2d ed.
1979). In contrast, an item which is accruing is inchoate or yet to become due. Id.
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review of the legislative history fails to indicate any congressional
direction as to its meaning within the context of section 706(g). Indeed, Congress failed to provide any direction as to the proper method
of calculating back pay awards within the strictures of section
706(g) .19
A hypothetical may serve to illustrate the effect of this lack of
guidance for back pay computations. An employee hired in 1964 for
an entry level position alleges that, but for unlawful discrimination,
he should have been promoted in 1965, 1968, 1972, 1975, and 1980.40
The employee filed a charge with the EEOC in 1980 and following an
EEOC investigation, suit is instituted against the employer for employment discrimination with the matter coming to trial in 1982. As a
defense, the employer pleads that the complaint is time barred as it
does not allege an unlawful act within the filing period. Clearly, the
complainant must demonstrate that he suffered a discriminatory act
during the filing period 4' before the court can proceed to the substantive issues.
If the court determines that the complainant was subject to
discrimination, it may then award back pay. 42 All courts agree that
under section 706(g), the complainant is entitled to back pay relief for
a period commencing in 1978 (two years prior to the 1980 filing) and
ending at the time judgment is rendered, 43 however, they differ
sharply as to how such back pay is calculated. For example, certain
courts will review the complainant's employment history considering
all acts occurring as far back as July 9, 1965 (the effective date of Title
VII), 44 while other courts will limit their review of the complainant's
employment history to the two year back pay period of section 706(g),
herein, 1978-1980. 45 It is evident that under the latter, more strict

39

See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 400 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y.

1975).
40

A prima facie case of employment discrimination requires a complainant to demonstrate

that he was eligible for promotion, i.e., that he qualified for an available position and was
rejected as a result of discriminatory practices. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
1' See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553 (1976).
12 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
43 See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
44 See infra note 47 and accompanying text. In particular, if the court accepted the complainant's allegations, it could judicially promote the complainant in 1965, 1968, 1972, 1975,
and 1980, thereby compounding one judicial promotion upon another.
11 See infra note 46 and accompanying text. Under this approach, the complainant would
only be allowed to recover damages if he could demonstrate that a position for which he was
qualified was available between 1978 and the date of trial. Therefore, back pay would be limited
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construction of back pay, the complainant's award may be substantially less than the award in which all past acts are considered. Therefore, a court's determination of the point at which back pay accrues
may produce strikingly divergent awards.
C. Judicial Interpretations
Given the lack of statutory and legislative guidance, courts have
applied section 706(g)'s two year limitation in extremely varied ways
in light of the facts presented and in accordance with each court's
particular disposition towards Title VII and its remedies. Nevertheless, two trends have emerged in the courts regarding back pay calculation. One position advocates calculation of back pay by considering
only those events which have transpired within two years of filing a
formal complaint with the EEOC. 46 The second position, urged initially by the Ninth Circuit, permits use of all events which occurred
after the effective date of Title VII, July 2, 1965, in calculating an
47
award.
The former and more restrictive position was developed in the
Fourth Circuit. In White v. Carolina PaperboardCorp. ,4 black employees brought an action alleging violations of Title VII. 49 The district court found that the employer had engaged in discriminatory
practices in denying blacks transfers and promotions to jobs traditionally held by white employees. 50 Accordingly, it formulated a broad
remedial back pay award from which the employer appealed. 5' On
to the difference between his salary at the entry level position and the salary offered at the
available position.
41 See, e.g., White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1977); Stewart v.
General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977);
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1976); see also infra notes 49-76 and
accompanying text.
"7See, e.g., EEOC v. Hay Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1082-83 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Thompson
v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Versoza v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 589 F.2d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1978); see also infra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
4" 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1977).
41 Id. at 1076-77. For an excellent discussion of Carolina Paperboard Corp., see C. SULLIVAN,

M.

ZIMMEn

&

R.

RICHARDS, FEDEAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION §

9.1, at 527-31 (1980).
-1 White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1299, 1304-05
(D.N.C. 1975), modified and remanded, 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1977). The court found that
blacks were assigned to menial, low-paying jobs in receiving, shipping, and carpentry, or jobs in
the heater room and yard while whites filled the higher-paying jobs of finishers, tenders,
converters, screenmen, oiler-boilermen, truck drivers, maintenance men, electricians, foremen,
and supervisors. Id.
11Id. at 1306-07. The award was computed by comparing the "average difference in yearly
earnings between black and white employees of the periods for which Company records were
available." Id. at 1307.
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appeal, the court restructured the lower court's back pay awards,
holding that "[u]nder the applicable two-year statute of limitations
for damages, the period of discrimination we consider here began on
June 30, 1967," two years prior to the EEOC charge. 52 The court then
reconstructed each affected black employee's hypothetical employment history, but only for the two year period preceding the EEOC
filing. 53 In effect, the court limited its consideration to events which
occurred within two years of the filing of the plaintiffs' EEOC
54
charge.
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning regarding the limitations period
has not been fully explicated, however, in EEOC v. General Electric
Co.,55 one panel deciding a similar case offered a partial explanation.
In General Electric, two black employees filed charges with the
EEOC alleging race discrimination in job transfer and promotion by
General Electric (GE), notice of which was forwarded to GE. 56
Through its investigation, the EEOC found that GE not only engaged
in race discrimination, but had engaged in discrimination against
women as well. 57 Subsequently, the EEOC brought suit alleging race
and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 5 On GE's motion, the
district court granted summary judgment on the sex discrimination
count stating that such a claim "could not reasonably have been
expected to grow out of the charge of [race] discrimination." 59 On
appeal, GE defended the trial court's order, contending that Title
VII's two year limitation on back pay implicitly limited the court's
inquiry to those charges of which the employer had been specifically
notified. ° GE argued that if additional types of discrimination could

52 564 F.2d at 1082. The employees filed their charges on June 30, 1969. Id. Under a strict
construction, § 706(g) is not applicable in this case since the charges were filed prior to March 24,
1972, the effective date of the amendment. Nevertheless, it appears that the court was applying
the statutory limitation in limiting the award to a two year period. But see Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 275 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1980)
(Title VII not retroactive).
5 564 F.2d at 1084-93.
IId.; accord Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1980).
55 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
51 Id. at 362. Section 706(e) of Title VII requires the EEOC to notify the alleged discriminator within 10 days of the filing of a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(e); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 (1982).
The rationale underlying this section is to provide the alleged discriminator with notice so as to
enable conciliation efforts and/or the preparation of a defense.
-7 564 F.2d at 362.
58 Id.
51 EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757, 760-61 (W.D. Va. '1974), rev'd and
remanded, 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
60 532 F.2d at 371.
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be asserted based upon a charge which solely alleged race discrimination, the employer could be liable for back pay based upon acts of
which it had no notice until the time of suit. 6 ' This liability would
impermissibly extend beyond the two year limit of section 706(g),
maintained GE, since the back pay recovery period is triggered by2 the
initial filing of EEOC charges rather than the receipt of notice.
The Fourth Circuit refused to dismiss the sex discrimination
charge, reasoning that an appellate court should not restrict the right
to back pay on the possibility that a back pay award may be based
upon a new charge discovered after an investigation has commenced. 6 3 Rather, the court held that back pay is a remedy which lies
within the discretion of the trial judge and therefore, should remain a
remedy available at trial.54 The court cautioned, however, that a trial
court should deny back pay when it prejudiced the employer, stating
that prejudice
may well be . . . [found] within the intent of the Act if any date
earlier than that on which the employer was given notice of the
claimed discrimination was used as the critical date for calculating
a claim for backpay. This was the date Congress seemingly intended as the critical date for such purpose. To limit the right to
backpay in this case ... to the period of two years before notice of
the claim was given the defendant by the filing of the EEOC's
determinations of "reasonable cause" would be clearly within the
discretion of the trial court and in keeping with the legislative
intent; in fact, to hold otherwise would be an abuse of discretion.6 s
Carolina PaperboardCorp. and General Electric were followed in
Stastny v. Southern Bell Telegraph & Telephone Co., 6 wherein female employees brought an action under Title VII, charging sex
discrimination. After several evidentiary hearings, the court found

" Id. In particular, GE argued that the original charge, filed two years prior to receipt of
notice of the sex discrimination finding, combined with the statutory right to back pay for a two
year period prior to filing of a charge could effectively result in GE being held liable for back pay
for at least four years prior to the time it had any notice of sex discrimination allegations. Id.
6
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
63 532 F.2d at 372-74.
64 Id. at 372.
65 Id. (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit indicated that GE's liability for back pay for the
sex discrimination claims should commence two years prior to the date GE received notice of the
sex discrimination charge. Id. The General Electric rationale may be aptly applied to cases
involving allegations of discrimination in promotion. See infra notes 180-201 and accompanying
text; see also Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 277 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1980) ("in the absence of countervailing equities, a trial court should limit
back pay to two years before the employer received notice of the results of the investigation").
66 458 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
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that the employer was guilty of discrimination and awarded back pay
as a remedy. The defendant had argued that back pay may not be
awarded for failure to promote to vacancies that had been filled prior
to the Title VII filing period. 7 Although the court refused to limit
back pay calculation to the statutory filing period, it did limit its
review to "valid, discriminatory non-promotions up to two years before the filing of a charge with the EEOC. '68 In so doing, the court
specifically noted that the plaintiffs would never be made whole for
discriminatory acts before the two year period. 9
In accord with the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit limits
back pay calculation to consideration of only those events which
occurred during the two years prior to the filing of a formal EEOC
charge. In Stewart v. General Motors Corp. 70 several black employees
representing a class of blacks 7I employed at a GM plant alleged racial
discrimination in hiring and promoting. 72 The plaintiffs had filed
charges with the EEOC in June of 1972. 73 On appeal of the district
court's finding of discrimination, the circuit court affirmed on the
issue of injunctive relief74 but remanded the action with instructions
to award back pay. 75 In calculating back pay, the appeals court
instructed the lower court to only consider "the period between June
1970 [two years prior to EEOC charges] and December 15, 1975 [the
76
date of district court's injunctive order].1
67 Id. at 321. In Stastny, the filing period was 90 days, as the charge was filed prior to the
effective date of the 1972 amendments. Id.; see supra note 9.
68 458 F. Supp. at 321.
69 Id.; see also EEOC v. Local 2P, Lithographers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, 412 F.
Supp. 530, 536-41 (D. Md. 1976) (blacks who were refused union membership entitled to back
pay equal to difference between union contract wage and actual wage, but only for period of
two years prior to EEOC charge).
70 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919
(1977).
71 Title VII actions have been held to be particularly suited for treatment as class actions. See
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975);
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (Proposed Amendments) (advisory committee note), 39 F.R.D. 102 (1966).
71 542 F.2d at 449.
13 Id. Since the plaintiffs filed their complaint after the effective date of § 706(g), the two
year back pay limitation applied to their suit. See generally supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
74 Injunctive relief is specifically provided for as a remedy for unlawful discrimination. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
71 542 F.2d at 451.
70 Id. at 454. The Third Circuit has not directly indicated how it would calculate back pay
awards. However, in Jewett v. ITT Corp., 653 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit court
noted that "[t]he time of filing [a charge with the EEOC] would, of course mark the time for
computing the two year limitation on back pay, and it might even prevent the award of any
monetary relief if an absence of job openings during those years were shown." Id. at 91 n.5.
Implicitly, the court seemed to indicate that it would limit its search for lost pay, at least
initially, to the two year period.
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Directly opposed to the Fourth and Seventh Circuits are the
Ninth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits."7 The Ninth Circuit court, in Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 8 was the first
appellate court to take an expansive view of section 706(g)'s two year
period. In Verzosa, a Filipino was hired by Merrill Lynch as a clerk,
and within the clerical ranks, he was promoted regularly. After his
application for promotion to the higher paying position of account
executive was denied three times, he filed a charge with the EEOC in
1973 and, thereafter, a civil action alleging race discrimination.7 9 The
lower court found that the plaintiff was qualified for the position and
that Merrill Lynch had refused to promote him solely because of his
race. 8° As a remedy, it awarded back pay computed as the difference
between his clerical salary and that of a comparable experienced
account executive for the two year period prior to his EEOC charge."'
On appeal, Merrill Lynch challenged the district court's calculation of
back pay which was premised on the court's determination that the
plaintiff would have been promoted in 1970. Merrill Lynch maintained that this promotion could only have occurred one year prior to
the two year limitations period of section 706(g) (1971-1973)."

2

The

Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's challenge on the grounds that
section 706(g) "limits the accrual period of back pay only, not other
forms of equitable relief. "3 Accordingly, the court held that section
706(g) did not operate "to specify how back pay liability for the twoyear accrual period shall be computed. "84
In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo., wherein the Supreme Court held, in accordance with its view that "one of the central purposes of Title VII is 'to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination,' " 85 that a federal court has the authority
pursuant to section 706(g) to award retroactive seniority relief.8 6 This
retroactive seniority could be awarded to victims of employment dis77 See infra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.

589 F.2d 974 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 975. Verzosa instituted a private suit pursuant to a right-to-sue letter issued by the
EEOC upon their refusal to bring an action. Id. See infra notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text.
80 589 F.2d at 975-76. The matter was initially referred to a special master whose findings
were adopted and award was approved by the district court. Id.
11 Id. at 976.
82 Id.
83 Id.
7.

71

84

Id.

424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975)).
85

86 Id.

at 762-66.
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crimination from the date their job applications were wrongfully
rejected. 87 It is important to note, however, that seniority awards,
unlike back pay awards, are not statutorily limited to a two year
period. 88 Moreover, Franks arose prior to the effective date of the 1972
amendments, and thus the Court did not consider the effect of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act.
The Fifth Circuit also has indicated that in calculating a back
pay award, it will allow consideration of events which occurred outside the two year period of section 706(g). In Crawford v. Western
Electric Co., 89 a district court had dismissed a race discrimination
action brought under Title VII for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the
plaintiffs had failed to follow Title VII's procedural requirements.9"
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that a question existed as to the
timeliness of the filed EEOC charges.9" Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded the action instructing the trial court to
specifically review the record for any unlawful acts of discrimination
occurring within the 180-day filing period. 92 More importantly, the
court instructed the trial court to review the issue of back pay liability,
stating: "Of course, back pay relief under Title VII is limited to the
two years preceding the filing of a charge with the EEOC. However,
liability of the employer for back pay may be based on acts occurring
outside the two-year period if a current violation is shown." 93 The
Crawford court relied on Miller v. Miami Prefabricators, Inc.94 in
which a group of black employees brought an action to recover for
racial discrimination in promotions. During discovery, the parties
requested a pretrial ruling on the scope of relief available, including
back pay. 95 The defendants argued that the 180-day filing period
contained in section 706(e) implicitly foreclosed consideration of any
promotion occurring prior to the 180th day before the filing of the
EEOC complaint. 96 The district court ruled that section 706(g) "does
87

Id. at 765-66.

" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
" 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
10 Id. at 1305-06. Plaintiffs also brought suit under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976). Although the § 1981 claims proceeded to trial, the plaintiffs lost on the merits. 614
F.2d at 1311. On appeal, the court found that the district court had relied on erroneous findings
of fact and remanded the issue to determine whether plaintiff's prima facie case was sufficiently
rebutted. Id. at 1321.
11 614 F.2d at 1306.
92 Id. at 1309.
11 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
14 438 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1977); see also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
1- 438 F. Supp. at 177.
98 Id. at 178.
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not limit the availability of back pay, but rather, limits the extent to
which that singular remedy may be afforded in making whole the
victims of racial discrimination. '1 7 The court held that it would consider each plaintiff's work history since 1965 and thereby determine
their " 'rightful place' " within the organization. 98 Only after determining the rightful employment status of the complainants would the
court apply the two year " 'cap on back pay.' -99
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit has firmly adopted
the Verzosa interpretation of section 706(g). In Thompson v. Sawyer'00 a group of women workers in the Government Printing Office
(GPO) instituted a class action alleging sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.101 The trial court awarded
back pay commencing from the date the first Executive order prohibiting discrimination in the GPO was issued. 102 The GPO contested the
back pay award, in part arguing that it was "erroneously inflated by
calculating back pay amounts by reference to positions the plaintiffs
might have filled, had they not been subject to discrimination after
1969, some three years before Title VII applied to GPO." 0 3 The D.C.
Circuit, upon review of the legislative history of the 1972 amendment,
rejected the GPO's argument and held that the district court properly
considered the effects of such long-term discrimination in calculating
04
back pay.1
The court premised its holding on the broad remedial
purposes of Title VII and the continuation of the GPO's discrimination occurring over a lengthy period of time. 0 5
" Id. at 181. The Miller court relied on two cases to arrive at this conclusion. See Clark v.
Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978) (sex
discrimination charge alleging failure to promote held timely); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975) (action charging discrimination in promotions distinguished
from action alleging discriminatory hiring practices as it "takes place on a particular day,
whereas in the promotion[al] area . . .[discrimination] invariably arises during a lengthy period
of time"); see also Bickley v. University of Md., 527 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1981). For a general
discussion of the continuing violation theory in this context, see infra notes 169-200.
11 438 F. Supp. at 182.
99 Id.
io0 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord McKenzie v. Sawyer, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,948 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
101 678 F.2d at 263. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56-57
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)), "prohibits payment of unequal wages for equal work on
grounds of sex." 678 F.2d at 263.
102 678 F.2d at 267.
103 Id. at 286. Title VII was applied generally to the Federal Government, and particularly to
the GPO, on March 24, 1972 under the Equal Employment Opportunity
No. 92-261, § 717, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
act, as noted supra note 32, limited back pay recovery to two years from
administrative complaint to the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(g).
101678 F.2d at 287-89; see also Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471 F. Supp.
"I See 678 F.2d at 287-89.

Act of 1972, Pub. L.
2000e-16). This same
the date of plaintiffs
767 (D.D.C. 1979).
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THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS THEORY
AND BACK PAY RECOVERY

Although the five circuits which have addressed the back pay
accrual issue appear to be hopelessly divergent, a review of each
approach in the context of judicial treatment of Title VII time limitations offers a possible path out of the thicket. As previously discussed,
Title VII plaintiffs must meet several procedural requirements before
a court may address their substantive claims.10 6 The foremost of these
prerequisites requires that a complainant file a charge with the EEOC
within 180 days of an unlawful discriminatory act. 107 When a plaintiff
identifies a specific discriminatory act within the filing period, courts
have had no problem proceeding to the merits, 08 however, when a
plaintiff fails to clearly meet this requirement, courts have taken
9 Several courts,
sharply different approaches. 10
despite the clear statutory time limits, have permitted actions which technically do not meet
Title VII's filing prerequisites, reasoning in large part that Title VII is
a broad remedial statute which is often invoked by unsophisticated
employees unversed in the procedural technicalities of the law.1 0
Conceptually, courts have reached these decisions by utilizing
what has come to be known as the continuing violations theory. 1 The
theory has been most often used under Title VII as "an analytical tool
. ..to find a claim actionable even though the alleged discrimination
has its origins in conduct occurring more than 180 days before the
filing of the charge with the EEOC.""12 The theory brings flexibility
10 See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
101See, e.g., Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div. 440 F.2d 1157, 1158-59 (8th
Cir. 1971).
0' Compare Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(compliance with statutory filing period prerequisite to invoking court's jurisdiction) with Laffey
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Title VII filing period not
jurisdictional prerequisite; rather, subject to equitable modifications), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
107

1086 (1978).
"I0 See, e.g., Ramirez v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
966, 969 (9th Cir. 1978); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir.
1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978); Rivas v. State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 27 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 715, 717 (D. Colo. 1981); Carter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 441 F. Supp.

808, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
111Much of this section draws upon research published in Jackson & Matheson, The Continuing Violations Theory and the Concept of Jurisdiction in Title VII Suits, 67 GEO. L. J. 811
(1979); see also Carty, The Continuing Violations Theory After United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,
31 HASTINcs L. J. 929 (1978); Note, Past Discriminationand Present Violations of Title VII, 92
HARv. L. REv. 757 (1979).
"I Jackson & Matheson, supra note 111, at 813. Although the theory has achieved notoriety
under Title VII for its use on the timeliness issue, the theory has also been used as a procedural
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to an otherwise rigid filing requirement that might often result in the
denial of Title VII remedies to employees who have suffered employment discrimination. 1 3 Nevertheless, although the purpose of the
theory is admirable, numerous courts recently have either strictly
limited its use or rejected it outright, citing concern that excessive
application of this approach would vitiate the explicit congressional
time limitations placed on the filing of Title VII actions and thereby
4
undermine the underlying statutory scheme."1
The continuing violations theory has been applied in varied manners and in different phases of the Title VII action. Courts have
utilized the theory when there exists continuing effects of past discriminatory acts," 5 a continuing employment relation,I" and a continuing
policy or practice of discrimination. " 7 Each of these analyses, although once widely used, has been severely limited, either explicitly
or implicitly, by recent Supreme Court decisions.

and an evidentiary tool in non-Title VII actions. See, e.g., Local Lodge No. 1424, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
1
See generally In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 980 (1981).
"4
See, e.g., Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United Airlines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977): Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 519 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1975); Turner
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 78 F.R.D. 654, 657 (E.D.N.C. 1978). But see C. SULLIVAN, M.
ZiMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 49, § 3.5, at 276 ("Title VII not only provides the 180- (300-)
day period for filing with the EEOC but also establishes a two-year limitation on backpay
liability. By allowing plaintiffs to recover backpay for a year and half prior to the 180-day filing
period, Congress must have envisioned continuing remediable violations which existed prior to
the running of the period") (footnotes omitted).
"5 See, e.g., Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219, 1222 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434
U.S. 1069 (1979); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1976); Pettwav v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 236 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354,
360-62 (8th Cir. 1973).
"I See, e.g., In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 980 (1981); Corbin v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 939, 944
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
"17 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 468 n.290 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 987-88 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
Research has also disclosed other cases in which the continuing violations theory was
discussed, but which analytically do not fall within the above three categories. See, e.g., Wood
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 580 F.2d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 1978) (continuing violation implicit in
congressional application of extended filing period to all charges, even those not timely, pending
with EEOC at time of extension); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.
1969) (action brought by plaintiff laid off prior to filing period alleging discriminatory recalls
was timely as constituting continuing violation and employer was obligated under labor agreement to recall by seniority for one year after layoff). These cases are generally limited to their
express facts, and accordingly, cannot serve as relevant precedent in a theoretical examination of
the continuing violation theory.
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The first approach, wherein a court looks to whether an employee has suffered the effects of a past discriminatory act during the
180-day filing period, has often been applied in the context of a
discriminatory hiring or rehiring matter. 18 The Supreme Court was
presented with such a case in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans."' In
Evans, a flight attendant had been employed by United Airlines from
1966 to 1968, at which time she was married and forced to resign her
position pursuant to United's then existing "no marriage" rule. 20 In
1972, after United rescinded the policy, she was rehired, but as a new
employee. 12' Despite her repeated requests, United refused to credit
her with the seniority she had earned while previously employed. 122
Thereafter, she filed charges with the EEOC, and later a civil action,
alleging that United's refusal to credit her with accrued seniority from
her original employment in 1966 constituted continuing sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 123 The district court dismissed her
complaint, holding that her failure to file a charge based on her
original separation within the statutorily mandated filing period
barred her action. 124 After an appeal in which the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that the complaint was properly dismissed. 125 The Court stated:
Respondent is correct in pointing out that the seniority system
gives present effect to a past act of discrimination. But United was
entitled to treat that past act as lawful after respondent failed to
file a charge of discrimination within the 90 days then allowed by
§ 706(d). A discriminatory act which is not made the basis of a
timely charge is the legal equivalent of a26discriminatory act which
occurred before the statute was passed.
The Court noted that the employer's policy "does indeed have a
continuing impact on . . . [the employee's] pay and fringe benefits.' 1 27 It stated, however, that "the emphasis should not-be placed on
mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation
exists.' 28 Since the plaintiff did not allege any violation which oc",
"9

120

22

See cases cited supra note 115.
431 U.S. 553 (1977).

Id. at 554-55.
I21
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.

123 Id.
124

at 554.

Id. at 556. Prior to March 1972, a plaintiff had to file charges within 90 days of the

unlawful discrimination. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12 431 U.S. at 557.
12 Id. at 558.
127
121

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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curred during the 180 days prior to the EEOC charge, her action was
dismissed. 129
The Evans Court thus rejected the plaintiff's and the circuit
court's attempts to extend the filing period by relying on events which
occurred prior to the statutory period. Indeed, it specifically indicated
that a present violation must occur within the statutorily defined time
period before a plaintiff's action will be permitted to proceed. 1 30 The
Court so ruled even though the plaintiff had obviously suffered continuing losses due to prior discriminatory acts. 3 1 As a result, the
continuing effects of past discrimination cannot establish a current
violation.
A second situation in which the continuing violations theory has
been applied-the continuing existence of an employment rela33
tion132 -suffered a similar fate in Delaware State College v. Ricks.1
In Ricks, a college professor alleged unlawful race discrimination in a
college's decision to deny him tenure. The plaintiff filed his charge
nearly one year after the college had notified him of its tenure decision
but prior to his actual dismissal.13 4 Ricks alleged that his charge was
29 Id. at 560; see Annot., 49 A.L.R. FED. 693 (1980) (cases applying Evans rationale); see also
Allen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1293 (5th Cir. 1982) (action claiming
discriminatory failure to recall dismissed since alleged unlawful acts occurred prior to filing
period; plaintiffs could not use continuing effect of alleged acts absent current violation); Bronze
Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1981) (charge alleging
city discriminated in hiring strictly from list promulgated by state civil service department
untimely when list was issued more than 180 days prior to plaintiffs filing of EEOC charges).
130 431 U.S. at 558.
"I Id. The EEOC interpreted Evans as holding only that discharges do not constitute continu-

ing violations of Title VII, and thus, the continuing violation theory remains applicable to
allegations of other unlawful employment practices. EEOC Interpretive Memorandum, [ 1977-2]
EMPL. PRnc. GUIDE (CCH)
5029 (July 8, 1977). This analysis of Evans, however, has been
rejected. See Martin v. Georgia Pac. Co., 568 F.2d 58, 62 (8th Cir. 1977) (black employee's
action for alleged discrimination in seniority policy dismissed because employee did not file with
EEOC until more than three years after alleged discrimination; court rejected attempts to
distinguish Evans on the ground that his employment continued with the defendant, whereas
plaintiff in Evans had been discharged and later rehired); Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co.,
479 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (acts occurring prior to filing period not evidence of pattern or
practice upon which finding of unlawful discrimination could be predicated; court rejected
argument that Evans does not apply in cases alleging broad, systematic practice and pattern of
racial discrimination in promotions); see also infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
32 Repeated failures to promote and transfer have been classified as per se continuing violations. See, e.g., Rivas v. State Bd. for Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 27 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 715 (D. Colo. 1981); Corbin v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
33 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
114 Id. at 252-54. The defendant's Board of Trustees decided to deny Ricks tenure on March
13, 1974. Id. at 252. In accordance with past practice, he was offered a one year terminal
contract which expired June 30, 1975. Id. at 253. The EEOC accepted Ricks' charge on April 28,
1975. Id. at 254.
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timely because he had filed his charge prior to his termination and,
3
therefore, while his employment by the defendant continued. "
The Third Circuit accepted Ricks' argument reasoning, inter
alia, that an employee should not be forced "to hire a lawyer or
otherwise commence proceedings against his or her employer" during
the term of his employment.13 6 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, indicating that the only alleged unlawful act stemmed
from the college's decision to deny Ricks tenure, therefore, his termination was merely a direct and nondiscriminatory result of that decision. 1 37 The Court emphasized that "[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of
action for employment discrimination."' 3 8 Rather, " '[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at
which the consequences of the acts become most painful.' ,'l3 The
Court cautioned that it is a court's function "to identify precisely the
'unlawful employment practice' " upon which each complaint is
based, and to determine if the practice occurred within the filing
period. 40 Since Ricks' complaint was based entirely upon the Board of
Trustees' decision to deny him tenure, an act which occurred nearly
141
one year prior to his EEOC charge, his action was dismissed.
Hence, as in Evans, the Supreme Court again rejected a lower
court's attempt to utilize events which occurred prior to the filing
period to find an action timely. 142 The court iterated that the statute
requires proof of an unlawful act within the statutory period, and
"I Id. at 257.
116 Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 250
(1980) (quoting Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 182, 197 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978)).
117 449 U.S. at 256-58.
138 Id. at 257.
139 Id. at 258 (quoting Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 209 (1979)) (emphasis in original); accord Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981) ("continuing
violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original
violation").
140 449 U.S. at 257.
l41 Id. at 262.
112 In Fernandez v. Chardon, 648 F.2d 765 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 28 (1981),
the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit attempted to limit Ricks' scope to tenure decisions. The
court held that the filing period runs from the date an employee is actually terminated, rather
than from the date on which an employee receives notice of such intended termination. Id. at
768-69. The court distinguished Ricks on the basis that the denial of tenure is a complete act
upon notification, while notice of termination is not completed until sometime thereafter. Id. at
769-70. The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the proper focus is upon the
discriminatory act (the decision to terminate) not the point at which the consequences of the act
become most painful. Fernandez v. Chardon, 102 S. Ct. 28, 29 (1981); accord EEOC v.
Kimberly Clark Corp., 531 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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accordingly, judicial attempts to apply events beyond this period will
be unavailing.' 4 3
A third situation in which the continuing violations theory has
been applied involves a determination that the employer engaged in a
discriminatory practice or policy. Cases of this type generally fall into
one of three categories: those in which the policy or practice ceased
prior to the filing period, 144 those in which the policy or practice
continues into the filing period but no action is taken under the policy
towards the plaintiff during the period, 45 and finally, those in which
the policy is in existence during the filing period and an act is taken
pursuant to such policy against the plaintiff.141
In the first category, it is clear that no cause of action may be
stated under Title VII since no unlawful conduct occurred within the
180 day filing period. 147 In the second category, the individual plaintiff has not been personally subjected to a discriminatory act during
the filing period. Nevertheless, he may have been subjected to unlawful acts prior to this period pursuant to a policy or practice which was
instituted prior the 180 day filing period and remained in force during
such period.1 4 Although this issue has not been presented to the
Supreme Court,149 several courts of appeals have dismissed actions
brought by complainants who were terminated prior to the mandated
filing period, despite a finding that the discharges were made pursu50
ant to an unlawful policy which continued into the filing period.

M4'449

U.S. at 259-60.
See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) (policy of discharging flight
attendant upon marriage abandoned prior to filing period).
115See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 987-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 458 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v.
Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F. Supp. 310, 312 (W.D.N.C. 1977); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel &
Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
'1
See, e.g., Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837 (6th Cir. 1982);
Jenkins v. Home Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1980) (action timely as period runs from the
date of each paycheck which reflects the discriminatorily lower pay rate).
"7 See supra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
148 See cases cited supra note 145.
"I This issue was not before the Evans Court as the plaintiffs request for seniority adjustment
was made after United's unlawful no-marriage policy had been rescinded. See Evans, 431 U.S.
at 555.
"' See, e.g., In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142, 1149 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 980 (1981); Masco v. United Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (3d
Cir. 1978) (filing period for female employees who were involuntarily terminated under unlawful pregnancy policy runs from date of termination, notwithstanding policy remaining in effect
during filing period); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
1"
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These courts have reasoned that after Evans, these discharges must be
treated as merely "unfortunate events in history." Indeed, the Third
Circuit has indicated that unless a plaintiff proves the existence of
unlawful acts within the actionable period, evidence which relates to
the prior period not only reflects "an unfortunate event in history" but
also merits consideration solely as "background evidence."' 51 Conversely, at least one court has continued to permit actions based solely
upon evidence of an unlawful policy or practice which continued into
the filing period. 152 It is submitted that these cases were wrongly
decided, if only as a matter of standing. 53 That is, while there may
well be a continuing violation subject to attack, a plaintiff not adversely affected within the statutory filing period has no standing to
attack the violation.
The concept of standing requires litigants to allege that they have
in fact suffered an injury as a result of the wrongful conduct. 54 In the
context of Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that he is an aggrieved
individual within the meaning of the statute. 155 Thus, if a policy or
practice does not adversely affect a plaintiff within the filing period,
that individual has suffered no actionable injury. 56 After Evans, a
plaintiff may not rely on prefiling period acts which were not the
subject of timely charges because, as to the complainant, these acts are
merely "unfortunate events in history."'' 57 Indeed, this principle ap"I Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 990 (3d Cir. 1981).
e.g., Caldwell v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 435 F. Supp. 310, 312 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
But see Turner v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R,, 78 F.R.D. 654, 657 (E.D.N.C. 1978) ("an
individual plaintiff may no longer . . .rely on allegations of continuing discrimination in order
to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement that his claim be [timely] filed "); Dickerson v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("it is clear to this Court that any action, not within
the statute of limitations period for the class, cannot serve as a basis for liability").
153 See Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1080 n.12 (3d
Cir. 1981). For a general discussion of standing, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 3-17 to 3-29 (1978).
154 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.Irvis, 407
U.S. 663, 666-67 (1972). It is important to note that the standing doctrine of article III of the
Constitution does not limit Congress' ability to define categories of individuals sufficiently
aggrieved to warrant federal judicial intervention at their behest. See FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
-55 Section 706(b) of Title VII permits aggreived individuals to file charges with the EEOC, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), and thereafter, if certain prerequisites are met, civil actions. Id. § 2000e5(f).
"I If racial minorities, however, are extremely underrepresented in an employer's workforce,
a plaintiff may obtain standing by alleging an injury arising from a loss of interracial association.
Cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) (two tenants had
standing to attack landlord's discriminatory practices as violative of fair housing section of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3620 (1976), wherein alleged injury resulted from loss of
interracial association with excluded tenants).
1.7 Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.
152 See,
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pears to be expressly recognized in Title VII's statutory scheme, as the
EEOC is the only entity statutorily authorized under Title VII to
institute actions based solely upon the existence of an unlawful policy
or practice. 58 Individual plaintiffs do not possess this prerogative
although a policy may have affected them in the past and may continue to affect them in the future.
In the third category, if a plaintiff proves that a specific act
occurred within the filing period which is part of an unlawful pattern
or practice and which directly and adversely affected him, he has
clearly stated a cause of action. 59 If the unlawful act is alleged to be
part of a continuing practice, pattern, or policy, a court may rely on
prefiling acts which form a part of this practice, pattern, or policy as
relevant evidence by which to review actions taken during the filing
period 10 and may even award certain types of relief for acts which
occurred during the prefiling period. ' 6' Thus, of the three possible fact
patterns under which the third type of continuing violations analysis is
utilized, only one may serve as the basis for a cause of action under
Title VII: those in which the plaintiff alleges an unlawful pattern,
practice, or policy which may have commenced prior to the filing
period but which directly and adversely affected him during this
period. This result is consonant not only with the Supreme Court's
63
previous opinions, 6 2 but also with Title VII's statutory scheme.
"' Prior to the 1972 amendments, the Attorney General was empowered pursuant to § 707 of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970), to institute pattern or practices suits against state or
local governments and private individuals or entities. Pursuant to the 1972 amendments, the
EEOC now has exclusive power to institute pattern or practice litigation against individuals or
private entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976). With respect to pattern or practice suits against
states and subdivisions thereof, the Attorney General retains sole statutory authority. See Reorg.
Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 note (Supp. III
1979). and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
15 See. e.g.. EEOC v. Hay Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 1064, 1082-83 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Kvriazi v.
Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 901-02 (D.N.J. 1978).
"0 See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 n.15 (1977); Croker
v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 990 (3d Cir. 1981).
s6 See. e.g.. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (retroactive seniority is
proper award to remedy discriminatory pattern or practice extending back to date of Act):
Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (injunctive relief may be awarded to
remedy prelimitation discriminatory acts).
162 See supra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
16' See Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1081-82 (3d
Cir. 1981) ("Confronting and limiting the continuing violation theory is the explicit statutory
180-day limit, enacted by Congress to 'protect employers from the burden of defending claims
arising from employment decisions that are long past' ")(quoting Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256-57); see
also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1977); cf. Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825-26 (1980) ("[I]n a statutory scheme in which Congress carefully
prescribed a series of deadlines measured by numbers of days-rather than months or years-we
may not simply interject an additional 60-day period into the procedural scheme. We must
respect the compromise embodied in the words chosen by Congress. It is not our place simply to
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Although the continuing violations theory may not retain its
previous stature as a method by which courts may find timely those
claims which rely only upon unlawful acts which occurred prior to the
filing period, 16 4 it certainly remains a viable evidentiary tool enabling
courts to consider events which occurred prior to the 180 day period as
relevant background evidence. 61 5 This approach has long been utilized
under the National Labor Relations Act'16 in construing events which
occurred prior to the six month limitations period for unfair labor
practice charges. 16 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically approved the use of the theory as an evidentiary tool, stating that
although prefiling period events may not be the basis of an actionable

alter the balance struck by Congress in procedural statutes by favoring one side or the other in
matters of statutory construction").
114 This sharp limitation upon the utilization of the continuing violations theory in Title VII
actions is not inconsistent with the legislative history of amended Title VII. The section by
section analysis of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, placed into the record by Senator Williams
of New Jersey provides in pertinent part:
In establishing the new time period for the filing of charges, it is not intended that
existing law, which has shown an inclination to interpret this type of time limitation
to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the law, should be in any way
circumscribed. Existing case law which has determined that certain types of violations are continuing in nature, thereby measuring the running of the required time
period from the last occurrence of the discriminationand not from the first occurrence is continued, and other interpretations of the courts maximizing the coverage
of the law are not affected. It is intended by expanding the time period for filing
charges in this subsection that aggrieved individuals, who frequently are untrained
laymen who are not always aware of the discrimination which is practiced against
them, should be given a greater opportunity to prepare their charges and file their
complaints, and that existent but undiscovered acts of discrimination should not
escape the effect of the law through a procedural oversight.
118 CONG. REc. 4941 (1972) (emphasis added).
The italicized language indicates that although the drafters intended the continuing violations theory to remain viable, they did not wish it to be used to resurrect untimely claims.
Rather, the amendment would require that an unlawful act, even if the last in a series of
wrongful acts, occur within the filing period to sustain a timely charge. It is also significant that
numerous courts have unnecessarily relied upon the continuing violations theory in finding a
cause of action when in each case there was evidence of unlawful acts occurring within the filing
period. See, e.g., Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837 (6th Cir. 1982)
(reliance on continuing violation theory in action involving continual sexual harassment and
discriminatory work assignments unnecessary since unlawful acts occurred during filing period).
But cf. West v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 94 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
13,664 (4th Cir. 1982)
(discharged employee's time to file § 301 wrongful discharge action ran from date of discharge;
employee could not keep claim alive by periodically requesting reinstatement).
"65 See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
166 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
187 Id. § 160(b); see, e.g., Local Lodge No. 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S.
411, 416 (1960). The Supreme Court has stated that, in many respects, Title VII was expressly
modeled after the NLRA. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 n.11 (1975); see
also supra note 37.

1983]

BACK PAY CALCULATIONS

claim, they certainly "may constitute relevant background evidence"
by which later events may be considered.' 6 8 It is this particular application of the continuing violations theory which is the focus of the
next section of this Article.
IV.

THE ROLE OF CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
IN BACK PAY ANALYSIS

Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly resisted use of the
continuing violations theory to render claims actionable which facially do not meet Title VII's time requirements, the theory has had a
dramatic impact on remedies. Numerous courts have specifically indicated that prelimitation period events may be considered in formulating Title VII remedies, including reinstatement, retroactive seniority,
and back pay.16 Moreover, in nearly every decision in which a court
has considered events prior to the two year back pay accrual period in
calculating back pay, the court premised its underlying discrimination
70
finding, at least in part, on the continuing violations theory. 1
Thompson v. Sawyer 7 ' presents a clear example of this analysis.
In Thompson, the D.C. Circuit court faced the argument that the
1972 amendments extending Title VII rights and remedies to Federal
Government employees could not be retroactively applied to award
back pay prior to 1972.172 In rejecting this argument, the court distinguished between complaints alleging "pre-1972 acts forming part of a
process of discrimination continuing past 1972" and those alleging
either "acts of discrimination terminated before 1972 . . . [or acts in]
which the statute of limitations has run . . . [but whose] impact . . .
continues to be felt. 1' 73 In the former, the court reasoned, the plaintiff
has alleged a present act of discrimination, while in the latter the
claimant has not alleged a current violation. 174 Given this distinction,
the Thompson court held that the plaintiffs' "right to sue [defendant]
...Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; see also Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981);
Fischer v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Crawford v.
Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1317 n.31 (5th Cir. 1980) (conduct giving rise to time-barred
action is relevant and may be relied on in conjunction with statistics to illuminate current
practices which, when viewed in isolation, may not indicate discriminatory motives).
"8I See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978); cases cited inJra
notes 170-89.
170 See, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980); Crawford v. Western Elec.
Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980); Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 589
F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1978).
7I See supra note 101 and accompanying text for a review of the facts of this case.
'7

678 F.2d at 286.
Id. at 289.

174

Id.

'7
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for acts of discrimination occurring before 1972 [arose] only because
the acts were part of a series of violations that continued beyond
1972.1"175
The court analogized such continuing violations to the right of a
victim of a series of tortious harms to recover for the entire series "even
though the statute of limitations may have run on the earlier harms in
the series."1 76 Applying this analogy to the Title VII back pay remedy,
the court measured the back pay award "by including all the effects of
a continuing process of illegal discrimination reaching back to
1969."17
Similarly, in Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,'178 the Ninth Circuit was presented with a case premised upon
continuing violations. The plaintiff in Verzosa applied for and was
denied a promotion three times over a two year period. 79 The Verzosa
court found that the plaintiff expressed a "continuing interest in promotion" which was rebuffed prior to and extending into the filing
period. 10 Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's back pay
calculations based on its finding that the plaintiff would probably
have been promoted one year prior to the filing period.'
Crawford v. Western Electric Co. 8 2 further demonstrates the
direct correlation between the continuing violations theory and extended back pay calculations. In Crawford, a group of telephone
installers alleged that Western's promotion practices were discriminatory. 8 3 The court held that in assessing a primafacie case under Title
VII, a court should consider prefiling events as evidence by which to
determine the lawfulness of acts or omissions occurring within the
filing period. 18 4 The court found that the trial court had not considered these past events and, therefore, remanded the case specifically

Id.
' Id. at 290. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.4 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 899 comment d (1979).
"' 678 F.2d at 290. Back pax was calculated by considering all events dating back to August
8, 1969, the date of the first Executive order prohibiting employment discrimination within the
175

GPO. Id.
See
589
Id.
lS' Id.
8.2 614
183 Id.
'7

'7
ISO

supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text for a review of the facts of this case.
F.2d at 975.
at 976-77.
at 977.
F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
at 1303.

Id. at 1309; cf. Local Lodge No. 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411,
416 (1960) ("Events occurring before the six month limitations period may be utilized to shed
light on the true character of matters occurring within the six month period").
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review prelimitation period events in its
ordering the trial court to
85
calculation of back pay. 1
This judicial application of the continuing violations theory to
the remedial phase of Title VII appears facially defensible. The use of
prefiling period events as evidence of the true character of later acts or
omissions is in accord with the Supreme Court's approval of the theory
as an evidentiary tool. 186 Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to have
applied this approach to reinstatement and seniority relief. In Franks
v. Bowman TransportationCorp.,187 the Court approved an award 1of
88
retroactive seniority as a remedy for employment discrimination.
Under the Franks approach, complainants who are unlawfully rejected for a position based on their race may be reinstated with
sufficient seniority so as to place them in the same position in the
employer's seniority system as they would have enjoyed had they been
hired at the time of their original application. 189 Granting retroactive
seniority necessarily requires a court to look back to the date of a
complainant's application, even though the application may have
been made long prior to the filing period.
Although this approach is entirely permissible for remedies such
as reinstatement and retroactive seniority, it encounters statutory
problems when applied to back pay awards. Section 706(g) limits
back pay awards to the two years prior to the filing of an EEOC
charge. 190 In enacting section 706(g) Congress repeatedly stated that
its purpose was to avoid subjecting employers "to enormous monetary
penalties."' 191 Nevertheless, by permitting recovery based upon events
which occurred as far in the past as 1965, courts have certainly raised
the spectre of enormous recoveries. 192 The possibility of such large
recoveries not only directly contravenes the legislative history supporting section 706(g), but also is actually a penalty-a remedy which
courts have steadfastly refused to permit under Title VII.113
165

614 F.2d at 1309.

186 See Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.
'8 424 U.S. 747 (1976); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977). For a discussion of the policies and rationale underlying Franks, see Myers, The
Scope and Implementation of Retroactive Seniority Awards Under Title VII, 9 SETON HALL L.
REV. 655, 695-97 (1978).
1. See 424 U.S. at 762-70. The Court noted that the legislative history of Title VII supported
retroactive seniority relief because it specifically authorized equitable relief and was intended to
place discriminates in their "rightful place[s]." Id. at 764 n.21.
8 Id. at 764-66.
90 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
163 See Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d
796, 808 (1st Cir. 1980); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir.
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Moreover, in calculating the effect of unlawful acts or omissions
alleged to have occurred in the distant past, courts will, of necessity,
be required to make factual determinations based upon the vague
recollections of witnesses and often incomplete or nonexistent employer records. 94 Such determinations could frequently result in mere
exercises in speculation. Accordingly, in enacting Title VII, Congress
fixed extremely short filing periods, 19 5 apparently based in part on a
desire to avoid litigation of stale claims grounded on long-past events.
The filing period was extended in 1972, but only to 180 days-a
rather short period-thus illustrating Congress' concern that employers should not be forced to defend claims which are based on remote
events. 9I
Therefore, an extension of the continuing violations theory into
the realm of back pay awards, although admirable in light of Title
VII's broad remedial purpose, 197 conflicts not only with the policy
underlying the statute's time periods' 98 but also with a plain reading of
the statutory language concerning back pay awards. 199
V. A PRoPosED

APPROACH TO

BACK PAY ANALYSIS

Three approaches may be taken to resolve this conflict. One
resolution, adopted by the Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, places an
expansive construction on section 706(g)'s two year statute of limitations. Under this approach, section 706(g) serves only to limit the back
pay period, and not back pay calculations therein. 20 0 Accordingly, a
court can, and often did, construct an entire employment history for a
complainant based upon its perception of the employer's operation

1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Richardson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 926-28 (3d Cir.
1977).
194 See, e.g., Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260-61 (5th
Cir. 1974). In appraising the probative worth of proffered evidence relating to events remote in
time, however, a court may reject the evidence or simply discount its value. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 709-10 (1962); International Shoe
Mach. Corp. v. United Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449, 469 (1st Cir. 1963). Also, for similiar
reasons, a person's declaration of state of mind or memory cannot be offered as proof that the
remembered event actually occurred. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 296 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
'o'
'9

See supra notes 9 & 15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 164.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
o See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
'00 See supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
'o7
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and the complainant's potential for advancement. 20 Although this
approach may be defensible under Title VII's broad "make whole"
purpose, 202 when applied, it may not only impose large monetary
liability on an employer, but also, more importantly it may often
make a complainant much more than "whole. ' 20 3 Hence, such forays
in the world of the possible may lead to judicial creation of a more
perfect employment career than is often attainable within the actual
work environment. Further, attempts to determine an individual's
career advancement over a period of ten or more years often becomes
not fact finding, but judicial speculation. It is submitted that such
speculation is unwarranted in light of Congress' firm resistance to
extend Title VII's time limitations beyond the short period now in
force.

20 4

A second approach which may be taken to resolve the conflict
between Title VII's broad remedial purposes and section 706(g) involves adopting a strict constructionist approach to section 706(g).
Under this approach, a court would apply the two year limitation
period strictly and thereby refuse to consider any prelimitation period
events in calculating back pay. 20 5 This approach is laudable for its
simplicity and adherence to the language and intent evident in section
706(g) and tends to strictly limit back pay awards. For example, if an
individual is able to show a continuing discriminatory policy which
manifests itself in a refusal to promote him during the filing period,
but unable to show any prior discriminatory acts during the two year
limitation period, his back pay award would be limited. Recovery
would be based solely on the discriminatory act occuring during the
180 day filing period, precluding a full two year back pay award
despite a discriminatory policy extending back to the date of the Act.
This result, premised on the limited use of prelimitation period events
although harsh, is consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting a
strictly limited back pay period. Moreover, it is consonant with the
Supreme Court's consistent resistance to use time-barred events for

201 See supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text. The complexity of this construction increases markedly when the complainant alleges discrimination in a managerial or professional
position given that promotions in these positions often turn on subjective discretionary assessments of intangible qualities. See generally Note, Title VII and Employment Discriminationin
"Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1614 (1973).
"0 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
203 In construing a complainant's employment status, a court may erroneously promote the
employee well beyond the level his individual capabilities would have actually been recognized
within the internal workforce competition, notwithstanding any consideration based on race.
"o4See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text; notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
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substantive purposes.2 06 As Evans and Ricks limited the role of prefiling period events in establishing a timely claim, 20 7 the Court's resistance can logically be extended to judicial consideration of prelimitation period events as a basis for calculating back pay awards.
This approach, despite its appeal as a matter of logic and statutory construction, has not been universally adopted by the courts.
Rather, they have adopted an often mechanistic approach, simply
interpreting section 706(g) in light of their own conception of Title
VII as a remedial statute.2 0 8 The courts have justified their approach
by relying on the Supreme Court's proclamation in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody2 9 that "backpay should be denied only for reasons
which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimina210
tion."
A final approach would permit courts to consider prelimitation
period events in calculating back pay awards, yet would place upon
the beneficiary of a back pay award the burden of proving his or her
right to such relief. More importantly, to avoid judicial speculation in
reconstructing employment histories, the plaintiff's burden would be
increased as to acts or omissions which are alleged to have occurred
prior to the two year back pay limitation period. As to these remote
events, the plaintiff would be required to demonstrate their existence
and relevance clearly and convincingly.
This approach represents a proper balance between the competing policies of compensating victims of discrimination and avoiding
enormous employer liability based upon judicial speculation. Under
this approach, victims of discrimination can properly be awarded
back pay relief for acts or omissions which are readily ascertainable,
but by raising the standard as more distant acts or omissions are
alleged, excessive and speculative awards can be avoided. Furthermore, this approach comports fully with current decisional law which
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate their eligibility for back pay
awards. 2 1 It is also in accord with the courts' consistent denial of
20I See supra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
207

See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.

208 See, e.g., cases cited and discussed supra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
2- 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
210 Id. at 421.
211 See, e.g., Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 98 (6th Cir.

1979); Taylor v. Philips Indus., 593 F.2d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 1979); Donnell v. General Motors
Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1978); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 453
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 919 (1977).
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compensatory and punitive damages to victims of discrimination on
the grounds that such relief is excessive and unwarranted under the
21 2
equitable nature of Title VII.
Indeed, it is the equitable nature of section 706(g) recognized by
Congress,2 1 3 the courts, 214 and commentators 2 15 which best supports
this third approach. Equity involves a process of balancing competing
interests whether they are embodied in general public policy or statutory directives.2 " This final approach would best achieve the desired
balance which section 706(g)'s back pay limitation represents. Although it does not foreclose enormous employer liability, it requires
that liability not be imposed unless it is justified by well established
evidence. On the other hand, it imposes restraints on back pay
awards, but only to the extent that relief is not properly supported by
clear and convincing evidence.

22

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); 118 CONG. REC. 2300 (1972).
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 375 (1977).
See Comment, Back Pay For Employment Discrimination Under Title VII-Role of the

2"3 See
214
215

Judiciary in Exercising Its Discretion, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 525, 529 (1974); Comment, Back Pay
in Class Actions and Pattern or Practice Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23
EMORY L.J. 163, 174 (1974).
2I See D. DOBBS, supra note 176, § 2.4. See generally Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing
the Equities", 18 TEX. L. REV. 412 (1940).

